

FRAGILE STATE AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY: THE PLACE OF NIGERIA: 2006 – 2017

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Abstract

This paper examines fragile state as its relate to public accountability and control a review of Nigeria from 2006 to 2017. The purpose is to relate Nigeria to fail state and assess whether Nigeria deserves the ranking usually done by FSI. This study uses qualitative research design to gain insight into the Nigerian public service as it relates to social, economic and political factors in determining its failed state status and accountability. The study also employs quantitative instrument of correlation to measure the strength of relationship between failed state index and accountability. The study makes use of the failed state index (FSI) from the Fund for Peace and the corruption perception index (CPI) from the Transparency International which serves as our proxy for accountability. The ranking of a failed state is based on the total scores of 12 indicators. Each indicator is placed on a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 being most and 10 being the most unstable. The total score of all the indicators gives the index for that country. The CPI ranks states by their perceived levels of public sector corruption. It is an index which is based on certain criteria which include bribery of public servants, embezzlement of public funds, cuts in public procurement and the effectiveness of the public sector's anticorruption effort. It uses a scale of 0 to 100, where 0 is highly corrupt and 100 clean. The FSI and CPI of Nigeria from 2006 to 2017 is presented below. It was found out that denial of successive regimes to tackle some obvious national issues such as the continuous decay of infrastructural facilities, poor assessment indices by both the United States National Intelligence Council and the World Bank, the issue of National Security such as political assassination and the Niger Delta crisis, the collapse of the judiciary that is the last hope of the common man, the collapse of the bureaucratic and political institutions are serious indicators of Nigeria being a fragile state. Also that these failures in the delivery of public services can be attributed largely to the high level of corruption and lack of accountability and transparency in the delivery of public services in spite of the various institutions established to check corrupt practices in Nigeria. It was however recommended that Nigeria has to strengthen its democratic

institutions, fight corruption, improve infrastructure and curtail insecurity to reclaim its power to avoid falling in the categories of fragile state.

Keywords: Failed State. Fragile State, Fund for peace, Accountability, Nigeria

Introduction

Failed state, according to the Fund for Peace 2017, is a state whose social, economic and political institutions are nearly collapsed or have crumbled totally. It is a state that is incapable of performing the two central responsibilities of an independent nation-state: it cannot command control over its territory and peoples, and it cannot protect its national boundaries. The governing capacity of a failed state is attenuated such that it is unable to fulfil the administrative and organizational tasks required to control people and resources and can provide only minimal public services. Its citizens no longer believe that their government is legitimate, and the state becomes illegitimate in the eyes of the international community. A failed state is made up of weak and blemish institutions. The different arms of government such as executive, legislative and the judiciary are not autonomous in their functions, i.e either one arm interfering in the function of another arm or an external force from outside. The armed forces have lost its responsibilities and independence by overthrowing legitimate authorities through coup and then followed by counter coup (Di, 2008). Failed state is characterized by poor infrastructure, unsteady utility supplies such as electricity and water, ailing educational and health facilities. This resulted to worsening human development indicators such as infant mortality, life expectancy, literacy rate and maternal mortality. Public accountability is lacking in a failed state this is because there is an enabling environment for corruption to thrive and even institutions set up to enforce accountability do so selectively by going after political opponents. State failure culminates from a series of civil war, ethnic or religious violence and genocide. It is the resultant effect of collapse of state institutions and societal decadence.

The Fragile States Index is based on a conflict assessment framework – known as “CAST” – that was developed by FFP nearly a quarter-century ago for assessing the vulnerability of states to collapse. The CAST framework was

designed to measure this vulnerability in pre-conflict, active conflict and post-conflict situations, and continues to be used widely by policy makers, field practitioners, and local community networks. The methodology uses both qualitative and quantitative indicators, relies on public source data, and produces quantifiable results. Twelve conflict risk indicators are used to measure the condition of a state at any given moment. The indicators provide a snapshot in time that can be measured against other snapshots in a time series to determine whether conditions are improving or worsening. A stable state ensures its citizens safe, economy is free and politics is fair to majority. The Fragile States Index published its eleventh annual report in 2015, prepared by the Fund for Peace and published by Foreign Policy Magazine. The Index categorizes states in four categories, with variations in each category. The Alert category is in dark red, Warning in orange, Stable in yellow and Sustainable in green. The FSI total score is out of 120, and in 2015 there were 178 states making the ranking. Initially, the FSI only ranked 75 countries in 2005. The FSI uses two criteria by which a country qualifies to be included in the list: first of all, the country must be a United Nations member state, and secondly, there must be a significant sample size of content and data available for that country to allow for meaningful analysis. There are three groupings: social, economic and political with overall twelve indicators.

Nigeria's has done poorly in the failed state index (FSI) over the years. It had an index of 94.4 out of 120 in 2006 making it 22nd most failed state in the world. In 2010, the FSI for Nigeria deteriorate to 100.2, becoming the 14th most failed state in the world. In 2014 the FSI was not much different as it worsens to 103.5 becoming the 13th most failed nation on earth (The Fund for Peace). In Nigeria, public accountability has become alien to state institutions, bureaucratic bottlenecks have truncated service delivery and public policy formulation and implementation have been relegated to just paper work. Embezzlement of public funds is on the increase and corruption has been institutionalized as a norm. In 2006, the Transparency International corruption perception index (CPI) for Nigeria was 22 out of 100 making Nigeria the 13th most corrupt country in the world. In 2010, the CPI improved a bit to 24 making Nigeria the 45th most corrupt country in the world. Nigeria ranked as the 32nd most corrupt country in the world (Transparency International). It is against this background that this paper examines those factors that makes the Nigerian state unstable, the relationship between Nigeria's failed state status

and accountability, and how Nigeria can improve its failed state ratings from unstable to stable.

Literature Review

According to the political theories of Max Weber, a state is defined as maintaining a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force within its borders. When this is broken (e.g., through the dominant presence of warlords, paramilitary groups, armed gangs, or terrorism), the very existence of the state becomes dubious, and the state becomes a failed state. The difficulty of determining whether a government maintains "a monopoly on the legitimate use of force", which includes the problems of the definition of "legitimate", means it is not clear precisely when a state can be said to have "failed". The problem of legitimacy can be solved by understanding what Weber intended by it. Weber explains that only the state has the means of production necessary for physical violence. This means that the state does not require legitimacy for achieving monopoly on having the means of violence (de facto), but will need one if it needs to use it (de jure).

The phrase "Failed State" is used differently by different people to describe different situations that appear characteristically the same. However the subjective nature of indicators that are used to measure state failure have led to an ambiguous understanding of the term. Szuhai (2015) for instance defined a failed state as a state whose central government is so weak or ineffective that it has little practical control over much of its territory. The term failed state according to some views is often used by political commentators and journalists to describe a state perceived as having failed at some of the basic conditions and responsibilities of a Sovereign Government. Some of the attributes of a failed state according to Fund for Peace (2006) Organisation are: Loss of political control of its territory; Loss of the monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force; Erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decision; Inability to provide reasonable public services; Inability to interact with other states as a full member of the International Community; Widespread corruption and criminality; Refugee crisis and involuntary population; Weak Central Government; Sharp economic decline.

The United States Crisis Research Centre also defines a failed state as a condition of state collapse i.e. state that can no longer perform its security and development functions and that has no effective control over its territory and borders. A failed state thus, according to this view is one that can no longer

reproduce the conditions for its own existence. Another description of a failed state was given in 2005 by the United States think-tank, the Fund Peace and the magazine Foreign Policy that publishes an annual index called the Failed States Index. The Index ranks are based on 12 indicators of the state vulnerability which include, four social, two economic, six political.

These indicators are however not designed to forecast when states may experience violence or collapse but are meant to measure states' vulnerability to collapse or conflict. The social factors are mostly demographic pressures driving from high population density. The economic indicators are borne out of the uneven and unequal distribution of resources. The political factors are criminality and delegitimization of the state or endemic corruption or profiteering by the ruling elites. The World Bank Report (2005) also described collapsing states as those characterised by some dysfunctional constraints. The states are embroiled in extended internal conflict, struggling through terror posts, conflict transition, faced with weak security situation, fractured societal relations, corruption, breakdown in the rule of law and lack of mechanism for generating legitimate power and authority. Bringing out some features of a failed state Ogbunwazeh (2007) states that a failed state indicates in its operations a loss of monopoly of violence and institutes the democratisation of violence. In this context, a state enroute to failure first suffers the loss of its authority to compel, obedience to the sanctions and provisions of its statutes and laws. It consequently loses the monopoly of the use or deployment of violence. The state lacks moral authority to compel obedience. To this end, violence is considered democratised.

Under the Principles of Social Contract, a failed state is seen as the one that hatches violence and breeds warlords and warmongers. In fact, it tolerates and empowers them. The failed state loses its authority to command monopoly violence. Its laws and statutes are objects of scorn and derision, to this end warlords and bandits are availed the rich to germinate and assume entity of much territories and armed jurisdiction as they can grab. In this situation, individuals lose their sense of security as fear of violent death lurks in every corner and fissure of life. Ironically, these were individuals who under the theoretical terms of the Social Contract subleased their rights and powers so that can accumulate and exercise a monopoly of violence for the general social good of the people.

As part of the debate about the state failure definition, Charles T. Call (2010) attempts to abandon the concept of state failure altogether; as, he argues, it

promotes an unclear understanding of what state failure means. *C. T. (2011)*. Indeed, one of the main contributions to the theorization of the "failed-state" is the "gap framework" developed by Call (2010). This framework builds on his previous (2008) criticisms of 'state failure', as a concept used as a catch-all term for diverse states with varying problems and as a base and explanation for universal policy prescriptions. It unpacks the concept of "state failure" focusing on three gaps that the state is not able to provide when it is in the process of failure: capacity, when state institutions lack the ability to effectively deliver basic goods and services to its population; security, when the state is unable to provide security to its population under the threat of armed groups; and legitimacy, when a "significant portion of its political elites and society reject the rules regulating power and the accumulation and distribution of wealth." *Call C. T. (2011)*. The "gap framework" seems to be more useful than other definitions. Instead of attempting to quantify the degree of failure of a state, the gap framework provides a three-dimensional scope useful to analyse the interplay between the government and the society in states in a more analytical way. Call does not necessarily suggest that states that suffer from the challenges of the three gaps should be identified as failed states; but instead, presents the gap idea as an alternative to the state failure concept as a whole. *Call C. T. (2011)* Although Call recognizes that the gap concept in itself has limits, since often states face two or more of the gap challenges, his conceptual proposition presents a useful way for more precisely identifying the challenges within a society and the policy prescriptions that are more likely to be effective for external and international actors to implement.

Further critique for the way in which the way the 'failed state' concept has been understood and operationalized is brought forth in research by Morten Bøås and Kathleen M. Jennings who, drawing on five case studies—Afghanistan, Somalia, Liberia, Sudan, and the Niger Delta region of Nigeria—argue that "the use of the 'failed state' label is inherently political, and based primarily on Western perceptions of Western security and interests". They go on to suggest that Western policy-makers attribute the 'failed' label to those states in which 'recession and informalization of the state is perceived to be a threat to Western interests'. *Jennings, K. M. (2007)* Furthermore, this suggests a hypocritical approach on behalf of Western policy-makers, due to the fact that the characteristics that would lead certain states to be labelled as failed are

accepted in other states where these characteristics are in accordance with Western interests. In fact, "this feature of state functioning is not only accepted, but also to a certain degree facilitated, as it creates an enabling environment for business and international capital. These cases are not branded 'failed states'". *Jennings, K. M. (2007)*.

A relevant contribution to the field of failed states and its attributes was made by J. Goldstone in his paper *Pathways to State Failure*. He defines a failed state as one that has lost both its effectiveness and legitimacy. Effectiveness means the capability to carry out state functions such as providing security or levying taxes. Legitimacy means the support of important groups of the population. A state that retains one of these two aspects is not failed as such; however it is in great danger of failing soon if nothing is done. He identifies five possible pathways to state failure: Escalation of communal group (ethnic or religious) conflicts. Examples: Syria, Somalia, Myanmar, Nigeria, Iraq, Yemen, Turkey, Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Rwanda, Liberia, Yugoslavia, Lebanon, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Sudan, South Sudan. State predation (corrupt or crony corralling of resources at the expense of other groups). Examples: Russian Federation, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Brazil, Philippines, Sudan, South Sudan, Eritrea, Zimbabwe, South Africa, North Korea, Saudi Arabia Regional or guerrilla rebellion. Examples: Syria, Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Turkey, Congo, Colombia, Vietnam. Democratic collapse (leading to civil war or coup d'etat). Examples: Nigeria, Madagascar, Nepal. Succession or reform crisis in authoritarian states. Examples: Indonesia under Suharto, Iran under the Shah, the Soviet Union under Gorbachev. Although Goldstone identifies pathways to state failure he is quick to warn about simplifying the issue. Often (re)-building either legitimacy or effectiveness implies a trade off with the other aspect of the state. Since these states are missing one of the two pillars to stability, it is dangerous to initiate such a trade-off as it takes time to rebuild trust from the population. Although state failure has been studied for decades by numerous scholars, it remains a contested concept vulnerable to political, ideological and economical agendas.

Failed State as it Relates to Accountability and Control

From the various views and definitions of failed state, one thing that is very

glaring is the characteristic and sign of a collapsing, decaying or vulnerability towards a failing situation in its ramifications. All the signs, features, failure indices of the situation in all cases are issues of deteriorating, disturbing and crisis situation that graphically crippled a functional system. These features are mostly attributed to deviation and derailing from the strict compliance with law and statutes of the state where Transparency, Accountability and control of public policies aimed at developing the state are enshrined (Okekeocha, 2013). The failure of public policy is a function of lack of inability and control and the end result is a delaying situation that emanate to a failed or failing state. This failure of public accountability and control in the examination of public policy can be attributed to the emergence of powerful state bureaucracy which can be assured by bureaucrats either for selfish ends or in the course of their dealings with the private citizens. According to Ademolekun (2005) the Consensus on Accountability is that while the state must be self-accounting on the basis of the constitution and the laws of the country, the individuals who exercise power on behalf of the state whether appointed or elected, must be accountable for the actions they take on behalf of the state.

In order to bring accountability and control to bureaucratic process in Nigeria, some of control measures have been put in place. For instance, the Public Complaints Commission has been established to act as a grievance redressing mechanism for the populace. The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and the Independent Corrupt Practices and other related Crimes Commission (ICPC) are yet another checking and balances institution that are established to bring accountability in Nigeria.

Apart from these mechanisms, some other internal control measures were also designed to ensure that the bureaucracy impact its business within some ethical parameters. Their internal measures not only provide an ethical environment within which its bureaucracy is expected to perform its responsibility but also act as a form of accountable measures for the service. There are the civil service rules and regulation and other government guidelines on bureaucratic procedures.

It is however painful to state here that in spite of these measures that were put in place in order to bring control and accountability by ensuring an ethical bureaucratic system, the bureaucratic ethics have been abandoned and acts of corruption has become the notion. Contributing to the issue of lack of accountability and control in the handling of public policy by the bureaucrats,

Mathew et al (2009) of the University of Birmingham undertook a study of how the Nigerian Airways and Ghana Airways collapsed. They narrated that both airlines had a similar tragedy i.e. they formed the West African regional airline setup by the British Colonial administration. The two airlines became separated after independence but both suffered high political interference, poor accountability, mismanagement, excessive debt and eventual liquidation. The demise of both airlines according to this study could be explained and by their direct connections to domestic political mercenary which made rational-legal bureaucratic relations that characterise modern organisations. Subservient to patrimonial relations, which the politicians and people in power treating these organisation as personal properties. The reasons for the collapse of these two airlines were a clear failure of control and accountability systems.

In this regard Clapham (1985) defines neo-patrimonialism as a form of organisation in which relationships of a broadly patrimonial type pervade a political and administrative system which is formally constituted on rational-legal lines. Officials hold positions in bureaucratic organisations with powers which are formally defined, but exercise of these powers, so far as they can, as a forum not of public service but of private property. This definition, capture aptly the Nigerian situation. As pointed out earlier, the Nigerian public policy was designed with rules, regulations and guidelines for implementation but the bureaucrats because of either interference or selfishness do not follow their control and accountability measures due to the neopatrimonial considerations and that is why the system at best could be described as a failure at the moment. These neopatrimonial attributes are translated into corrupt practice both by the politicians and the bureaucrats. As Hope (1985) stated the genesis of bureaucratic corruption as a result of the politicisation of the bureaucracy in the third world. Political corruption has laid down the grounds for bureaucratic corruption in the third world. These persistent corrupt practices are therefore forms of anti-social behaviours by individuals or social groups which confer unjust and fraudulent benefits on its perpetration and are inconsistent with the established legal norms and prescribed moral ethos of public policy and if care is not taken they would likely subvert or diminish the capacity of legitimate authorities to provide fully for the material and spiritual well-being of all the members of the public in a just and equitable manner.

Going by the signs, the alerts, and the indices of a failed state Nigeria as a nation is really in the making and if care is not taken it will definitely reach

there one day. Population pressure is one of the characteristics. With a population of over 140 million people, Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa with a GDP second only to South Africa. Yet due to the several years of military rule and poor economic mismanagement, Nigeria experienced a prolonged period of economic stagnation, rising poverty and the decline of its public institutions. In most cases, human development indicators in Nigeria are comparable to that of other least developed countries while widespread corruption undermined the effectiveness of various public expenditure programmes on public policy. More so, the lack of public investment in the past for long period of time suggests that there are severe infrastructural bottlenecks that hindered private sector activities. In particular, the poor condition of the power sector in the country further compounded the problem. Iweala et al (2007).

Economic crisis is also a strong indicator of a failing state. In Nigeria for instance, the economic performance of the country in the last two decades was generally poor. Over the period from 1992-2002, annual GDP growth had averaged about 2.25%. So, with an estimated population growth of 2.80% per annum there is expected contraction in per capita GDP over the years that had resulted in a deterioration of living standard of the Nigerian people. Inflation levels are highly averaging about 28.94% per annum over the same period mentioned above, Iweala et al (2007). Going by the above at the moment, it is an undisputable fact that most human development indicators are worse than or can be comparable to that of any other least developed country. Ezeani (2006) also gave some reasons why control and accountability has failed in the public sector as follows: Excessive control and lack of autonomy; Excessive political interference; Absence of competitive environment; Multiple and often contradictory objectives of the enterprise; Corruption; Poor infrastructure.

Most if not all the above are inherent in the operation of the Nigerian public policy and that is why the bad signal of a failing state. Owing to the above in order to enhance high standard of public accountability according to Sani (2008) particularly in the developing and relatively unstable economies such as Nigeria there is the need for a fearless press working hand in hand with an informed and critical public. This may be achievable only where the society is free from corruption and corrupt practices since in most of these developing economies, the press is also highly corrupt and the public are not enlightened enough to be critical. So for the concept of public accountability to work

effectively in both theory and practice, there must exist in society a healthy, unfettered press and an articulate conscious public which is not yet the case in most developing countries such as Nigeria. What is therefore urgently needed in the control and management of public finances of the developing economies including Nigeria is a more citizen focused and a more public initiated approach that can make the rulers truly accountable to the people. In Nigeria for instance, the political and the bureaucratic processes have clearly shown some signs of failure due to the fraudulent and corrupt practices that pervades the entire process. The 2007 presidential election for instance was described as highly flawed due to the massive rigging just like the one that was held in 2003. Reacting to the political situation, Adejumo (2008) stated that;

“The 2007 election has come and gone. It has been pronounced as flawed by the whole world, except the politicians and others of their ilk who gained from it whether by rigging or by coalition with the INEC and other associated government or political officials.” Adejumo (2008).

The issue of infrastructural development must be given utmost priority if the nation is to move forward. For instance, in the 2009 budget, the Federal Ministry of Works was proposed to complete the rehabilitation and construction of 3,293km length of roads nationwide. Under the Federal Roads Maintenance Agency (FERMA) about 10,676km roads were expected to be kept in motorable condition under the retainership programme and 20,000 km roads were supposed to undergo emergency repair work these are in addition to the zonal intervention road project earmarked for each geo-political zone in the Country. (Peoples Monthly Magazine July 30th 2009, issue 18). The above is by no means a positive effort towards improving road networks in Nigeria but if one looks around, one would see that most if not all these projects are either poorly executed, halfway done or not started at all.

Transportation, power and energy are essential and without which modern economy cannot be built. The regime understood this reality and took bold step to handle the situation. According to the president “I set up a small committee to workout what we require in terms of infrastructure development (peoples monthly magazines July 30th 2009, issue 18). In pursuance of the presidential mandate on power and energy, the President appointed a steering committee known as the Nigerian Integrated Power Project Committee

headed by the Vice President. The Committee was given a total of 117.30bn Naira for the various projects. Also, in an effort to address the nation's power problems and to meet the target of 10,000 megawatts by 2011, the National Executive Council (NEC) approved the sum of 323,158,286,574.51 billion naira. (Peoples Monthly Magazines July 30th 2009, issue 18). This amount represents 40% of the 5.3 billion naira approved by National Executive Council (NEC) drawn from the joint funds of States and the Federal Government but yet the issue of generating enough power for use by Nigerians is still too far from being realised. As it is now, the issue of transportation is a serious problem because there are no public transport and the reactivating of the railway lines are still at infancy stage with no hope of being accomplished in the near future.

The oil sector is also being reformed in order to make NNPC a National Oil Company that will go out to compete with multinational oil companies operating in Nigeria Like Shell, Agip, Oando, etc, but it is not a gainsaying however to state that Nigerians are still battling with high cost of petroleum products which they cannot afford to buy even for their domestic use.

On the issue of food security as one of the agenda of the Government, the Federal Executive Council meeting of May 29, 2009 approved some measures in order to cushion the effect of food crisis in Nigeria under the National Programme for Food Security. These measures are:

1. The suspension of all levies and duties on rice imports for a period of 6 months.
2. The utilisation of 80.28 billion naira fund accruing to the development of natural resources account between 2009 and 2011 to boost domestic production of food crops and development of agro-allied industries.
3. The provision of 10 billion naira from the rice levy account for a credit scheme in support of local rice processing. Credit granted under this scheme will attract 4% interest rate and a repayment period of 15 years with 5 year moratorium.
4. The completion of all outstanding food storage projects across the nation before the end of 2009 in order to increase the capacity of the National Strategic Food Reserve from 300,000 to 600,000 metric tonnes.

Some of these measures have been implemented and others are being implemented. The only problem is the way and manner in which they are

either implemented or being implemented which is the big question that remained unanswered because Nigerians are yet to see any positive changes on food and food crisis. The average Nigerian is eating from the dustbin because of the harsh economic situation in the country.

Methodology

This study uses qualitative research design to gain insight into the Nigerian public service as it relates to social, economic and political factors in determining its failed state status and accountability. The study also employs quantitative instrument of correlation to measure the strength of relationship between failed state index and accountability. The study makes use of the failed state index (FSI) from the Fund for Peace and the corruption perception index (CPI) from the Transparency International which serves as our proxy for accountability. The ranking of a failed state is based on the total scores of 12 indicators which are security apparatus, factionalized elites, group grievance, economy, economic inequality, human flight and brain drain, state legitimacy, public services, human right, demographic pressures, refugees and internally displaced persons, external intervention. Each indicator is placed on a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 being most and 10 being the most unstable. The total score of all the indicators gives the index for that country. The CPI ranks states by their perceived levels of public sector corruption. It is an index which is based on certain criteria which include bribery of public servants, embezzlement of public funds, cuts in public procurement and the effectiveness of the public sector's anticorruption effort. It uses a scale of 0 to 100, where 0 is highly corrupt and 100 clean. The FSI and CPI of Nigeria from 2006 to 2017 is presented below

Table 1: The FSI and CPI of Nigeria from 2006 to 2017

Year	FSI	CPI
2006	94.4	22
2007	95.6	22
2008	95.7	27
2009	99.8	25
2010	100.2	24
2011	99.1	24
2012	101.1	27
2013	100.7	25
2014	99.7	27
2015	102.5	26
2016	103.5	28
2017	101.6	27

Source: The Fund for Peace and Transparency International

This paper will employ correlation analysis to measure the strength or degree of relationship between Nigeria's failed state and public accountability.

Results

From table 1, 2016 was Nigeria's worst as an unstable state with an index of 103.5 out of 120 while 2006 was Nigeria's most stable year with a FSI of 94.4 within this period of study. The CPI of 28 in 2016 was Nigeria's worst. While in 2006 and 2007 Nigerians were better perceived to be less corrupt and more accountable than any other year.

Table 2.

	FSI	CPI
FSI	1.0000	
CPI	0.6619	1.0000

Table 2 shows the correlation results between the failed state index and the corruption perception index. With a correlation coefficient of 0.66 it means FSI have a linear and positive relationship with CPI.

Conclusion

We have seen the definitions of a failed state as put forward by the various scholars and the relevant institutions. The characteristics and signs of a failed state were clearly spelt out including the indices contained therein. Our analysis, however, shows glaringly that most if not all of these issues were either presently in existence or will be in the near future.

We have also seen in our analysis for instance in Nigeria, that Power is an area of serious concern. It is absolutely not in dispute that the biggest hurdle in the nation's development process is intractable power problems which were well acknowledged by Mr. President. For instance, when the president came into power in May 2007 electricity generation in the country was around 1,500 – 2,000 megawatts and today the electricity generating stands between 3,000 – 3,600 megawatts and he made a pledge of generating at least 6,000 megawatts by 2010, meaning that the president has a long way to go with regards to fulfilling his pledge on this issue which is part of his pact with the Nigerian citizens.

National Security as one of the issues to be tackled remained a lingering problem of the nation. Political Assassination, kidnapping, Niger Delta Problem, Jos Crisis, Anambra Crisis, highway armed robbery and political crisis in most of the states of the Federation are on the increase without permanent solution being proffered at the moment or in the near future. This is created largely due to illegitimate electoral process as we have seen. Contributing to this topic, Ademolekun (2005) stated that “a wider spread dividend of democratic transition in the sense of reliance on establishing government through election, is peace which is widely acknowledged as a precondition for development. The absence of peace is without question a major explanatory factor for the phenomenon of collapsing states.”

High prevalence of diseases such as malaria, HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis etc are still the order of the day. The Government is yet to put in any serious measures that will minimize or curtail the incidence of these diseases. The solution more often than not, is left in the hands of non-governmental organizations who in their operations have no allegiance to the nation to their home state. The failure of public policy in Nigeria has contributed to most if not all of these problems. Good policies are made but poorly implemented thereby defeating the purpose for which government is formed. The essence of government is to guarantee the collective good on behalf of the citizenry. In this context, power relationship between the government and the citizen would have been

safeguarded. Public policy is therefore seen by Dlakwa (2009) as the instrument used by the government to actualise the provision of the social contract.

Contributing to the issue of failure of Public Policy in the delivery of service to the public, Olowu in Ademolekun (2005) was of the view that public interest is shifting to the possible roles of private sector, voluntary organisation and communities in improving the delivery of public services. Furthermore, the reforms that are being carried out are half hearted and did not involve the generality of the Nigerian society. They are mostly conceived and initiated outside the Nigerian borders. That was why the public sector was made the scapegoat while the private sector was left alone. Thus in the words of Sani (2008), “in fact, the private sector sat back and was mocking at the victims on whom the axe had fallen in the public sector.”

This means that the body polity in Nigeria is about to destroy its existence because the Nigerian public have started losing confidence in the whole process of governance and most especially the recent one that was ushered in through maladjusted and manipulated political and electoral process and poor execution of public policy. The end result as expected is that the desired goals would not be delivered to the governed as most of the promises made during campaigns were not fulfilled. Thus in the words of Rousseau (1998),

“The body polity, as well as the human body begins to die from its birth, and bears in its self the causes of its own destruction. But both may have a constitution more or less robust and fitted to preserve them a longer or shorter time. The constitution of a man is a work of nature and that of the state is a work of art. It does not rest with men to prolong their lives; it does rest with them to prolong that of the state as far as possible by giving it the best constitution practicable. The best constitution will come to an end but not soon as another, unless some unforeseen accidents bring about its premature destruction.”

And if care is not taken, the above will be the fate of the Nigeria's body polity and the dissolution of the social pact with people i.e. the Nigerian state will soon fail if immediate measures are not taken. At this junction I would like to borrow from Ogbunwazeh (2007) who drew from the lessons of history of strong nations and empires that collapsed, stated that there are obvious signs that Nigeria is on its road to failure as a state. He based his arguments on some

factors such as:-

- i. Denial of successive regimes to tackle some obvious national issues such as the continuous decay of infrastructural facilities.
- ii. Poor assessment indices by both the United States National Intelligence Council and the World Bank.
- iii. The issue of National Security such as political assassination and the Niger Delta crisis.
- iv. The collapse of the judiciary that is the last hope of the common man.
- v. The collapse of the bureaucratic and political institutions.

These failures in the delivery of public services can be attributed largely to the high level of corruption and lack of accountability and transparency in the delivery of public services in spite of the various institutions established to check corrupt practices in Nigeria. Reacting to the situation, Olowu in Ademolekun (2005) gave a reason as to why transparency and accountability cannot be accomplished in Nigeria. He opined that the pressure for greater accountability and transparency is in conflict with the traditional requirement for confidentiality in the conduct of government business. The above issues are problems that are very obvious in Nigeria and efforts are being made through the reform agenda of the successive regimes to address some if not all of them but the solution is still far from being fetched. Should these problems continue without concrete solution then, Nigeria is and will definitely be on its way to collapse.

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